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THE SLIPPERY SHELF: CEDING THE PUBLIC




After ten years in the gauntlet of the administrative approval
process, Massachusetts-based Cape Wind Associates secured the last of
the requisite federal permits to begin construction on the nation’s first
offshore wind farm in January 2011.1 While the two billion dollar project
still needs financing before construction begins,2 federal approval of the
project sets the stage for converting the hypothetical potential of offshore
wind power into a reality.
Despite this milestone, the Cape Wind saga has illustrated the
difficulties encountered through the regulatory framework for offshore
development.3 If the Cape Wind saga failed to attract attention to it, the reg-
ulation of offshore development activities has come under increased scru-
tiny with the failure of administrative oversight in the Deepwater Horizon
oil leak.4 Exactly who governs development and safeguards enforcement
of regulations in the outer continental land shelf emerged as an issue,5
* Rachel Ganong is a 2012 J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School. She graduated
magna cum laude from Cedarville University with a B.A. in English and subsequently
worked as a newspaper reporter before entering law school. The author would like to
thank her parents, Brian and Margaret Ganong, and her family for their support during
law school; Peter Hershey, ’11, for his encouragement during the writing of this note; and
the ELPR staff for their editorial work.
1 Cape Wind Gets Its Final Federal Permit, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.boston
.com/lifestyle/green/articles/2011/01/08/cape_wind_gets_its_final_federal_permit/.
2 Id.
3 See Thomas Arthur Utzinger, Federal Permitting Issues Related to Offshore Wind Energy,
Using the Cape Wind Project in Massachusetts as an Illustration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,794
(2004) (noting three possible federal permitting challenges to the Cape Wind project).
4 See generally Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://topics.nytimes
.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_2010/index.html
(compiling coverage and updates on the 86-day spill).
5 Ian Urbina, At Issue in Gulf: Who Was in Charge?, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2010, at A1 (noting
that “at least a dozen federal agencies have taken part in the spill response, making decision-
making slow, conflicted and confused, as they sought to apply numerous federal statutes.”).
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along with millions of gallons of oil, during this highly publicized envi-
ronmental fiasco.6
While the Cape Wind approval process has theoretically ended7 and
oil has stopped flowing from the Deepwater Horizon leak,8 the question
of offshore development merits continued attention.9 For example, in
October, Google and a New York financial firm agreed to invest in a five
billion dollar offshore wind power transmission line that would stretch
from New Jersey to Norfolk, Virginia.10 The transmission line, set for con-
struction in 2013 but not likely to be completed before 2021, would cut
down on government permitting processes by having only four connection
points to land in an attempt to jump-start the American wind energy
industry.11 Additionally, the U.S. Department of Energy has said it in-
tends to spend $50.5 million over the next five years and grant expedited
reviews to spur offshore wind farm development off the coasts of Virginia,
Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey in an effort to meet President
Obama’s goal of generating eighty percent of the nation’s energy from re-
newable sources.12 These expedited reviews could result in leasing more
areas for wind energy production as early as the end of 2011 or the be-
ginning of 2012.13 While Europe has commercially harvested wind for
centuries,14 and offshore wind since the 1990s,15 construction on the Cape
6 Oil Spill Count Was Right, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A16 (noting that an
estimated 172–185 million gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico as a result of the
Deepwater Horizon incident).
7 Cape Wind Gets Its Final Federal Permit, supra note 1.
8 Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Caps Its Leaking Well, Stopping the Oil After
86 Days, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A1.
9 See Jeremy Firestone et al., Regulating Offshore Wind Power and Aquaculture: Messages
from Land and Sea, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 91 (2004) (“With the glaring lack of
any comprehensive and consistent management framework, it is clear that a new legal re-
gime is needed to address new ocean uses such as offshore wind power and aquaculture.”).
10 Matthew L. Wald, Offshore Wind Power Line Wins Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010,
at A1.
11 Id.
12 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Salazar, Chu Announce Major Offshore Wind
Initiatives (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/progress_alerts
.cfm/pa_id=476.
13 Id.
14 Peter A. Gish, Project Financing of Renewable Energy Projects in Europe: An Improving
Market, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 405, 408 (noting that Dutch businessmen were
powering textile mills with wind in the seventeenth century).
15 WENDY WILLIAMS & ROBERT WHITCOMB, CAPE WIND: MONEY, CELEBRITY, CLASS, POLITICS,
AND THE BATTLE FOR OUR ENERGY FUTURE ON NANTUCKET SOUND 15 (2007).
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Wind project is expected to start by the end of 2011.16 With more invest-
ment in offshore wind farms17 and the impending construction of Cape
Wind as the nation’s first and world’s largest offshore wind farming
project,18 closer inspection of the regulatory framework for offshore wind
projects is merited.
Much has already been said. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
approved the state’s regulatory process in August 2010, clearing yet an-
other challenge to Cape Wind’s epic permitting process by sanctioning ap-
proval for all the necessary state and local permits.19 While multiple law
suits challenging the project are still pending, the federal government has
also granted all the requisite permits for the project, enabling construc-
tion to start in fall 2011.20 The Massachusetts Supreme Court decision,
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting
Board,21 called “outrageous” by opponents,22 raised questions about the
extent of local governance over projects partly traversing a state’s sub-
merged lands, but physically sited in waters under federal jurisdiction.23
If states are precluded from evaluating the overall impact of projects,
even those that only fall within their jurisdiction by virtue of a cable trans-
mission line,24 then how will they be able to protect their citizens from
adverse project externalities? How, too, will state officials perform their
duty of safeguarding the interests of citizens as codified in public trust
16 Beth Daley, SJC Ruling Gives Cape Wind Project Green Light to Build, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/green/articles/2010/09
/01/sjc_ruling_gives_cape_wind_project_green_light_to_build/.
17 Wald, supra note 10.
18 Michael P. Giordano, Comment, Offshore Windfall: What Approval of the United States’
First Offshore Wind Project Means for the Offshore Wind Energy Industry, 44 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2010).
19 Daley, supra note 16, at A1.
20 Beth Daley, U.S. Gives Green Light to Cape Wind Project, BOSTON GLOBE, April 20, 2011,
http://articles.boston.com/2011-04-20/news/29451876_1_cape-wind-project-offshore-wind
-audra-parker.
21 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787
(Mass. 2010).
22 Daley, supra note 16, at A1.
23 Technically, the federal government can regulate “commerce, navigation, power
generation, national defense and international affairs” even throughout a state’s three-
mile territorial sea, while the states are granted authority to manage these areas in ways
consistent with the public trust doctrine. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., PRIMER
ON OCEAN JURISDICTIONS: DRAWING LINES IN THE WATER 71 (2011), available at http://
aquaculture.noaa.gov/pdf/uscopgrapocbnd.pdf. The federal government has exclusive juris-
diction over seabed resources up to 200 miles off of its coast. Id.
24 See Erica Schroeder, Turning Offshore Wind On, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1644 (2010).
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doctrines,25 which assert that certain resources belong to the public under
the guardianship of their government?26
Whether they are offshore wind farms or seabed mining opera-
tions, many of these projects sit outside the three-mile mark of a state’s
jurisdiction27 but nonetheless impact the adjacent coastal states.28 In re-
gard to offshore wind farming, many of these impacts are positive and
benefit the rest of a country cognizant of the need for renewable energy.29
However, the existing regulatory framework may fail to guard against
potential negative impacts to the states, particularly when viewed in light
of the public trust doctrine.30 These negative impacts may include impedi-
ments to navigation, disruption of fish populations, avian mortality, noise,
radiation pollution, and aesthetic impairment.31 Failing to guard against
25 The Justinian Code first codified the use of the sea and seashore for public use in 50 A.D.
as part of Roman civil law, stating:
By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind—the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one,
therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he re-
spects habitations, monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like
the sea, subject only to the law of nations.
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7E-3.50, Comment 80(e) (2011). For a discussion on the public
trust doctrine, see generally JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S COASTS (1994). For a specific discussion on the historical
development of the Massachusetts Public Trust doctrine, see MASS. OFFICE OF COASTAL
ZONE MGMT., THE OCEAN AS A PUBLIC TRUST RESOURCE (Mar. 2011), available at http://
www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/waves_of_change/pdf/trpt.pdf.
26 See George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural
Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 308 (2006).
27 Id. at 310; 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
28 See Timothy A. Hayden, Comment, Reception on Nantucket Sound? A Summary of
Current Offshore Wind Farm Litigation and a Federal Legislative Proposal Taking Cues
From Cellular Tower Legislation, 13 PENN STATE ENVTL. L. REV. 217, 227 (2005) (listing
negative impacts of offshore wind projects).
29 Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality—Finding Ways to Site Wind
Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 635, 646 (2008) (noting in-
creasing demand for electricity and the ramifications of heavy coal reliance have in-
creased support for renewable energy).
30 See Hayden, supra note 28, at 227 (listing negative impacts of offshore wind projects).
31 See id. (noting that offshore wind farm complaints compare to those registered against
cell phone towers and “include arguments that the structures amount to eyesores, that
wildlife will be adversely affected by their existence, and that they are sources of pol-
lutants that will harm their surrounding environment. It is also argued that the culmi-
nation of these factors causes a drop in property values.”); Elizabeth A. Ransom, Wind
Power Development on the United States Outer Continental Shelf: Balancing Efficient
Development and Environmental Risks in the Shadow of the OSCLA, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 465, 471–72 (2004) (noting that project turbines could kill birds on the “Atlantic
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these negative externalities presents a problem for states, especially when
meeting national wind power generation goals, and will require siting thou-
sands of wind farms across the country both on land and offshore.32 This
Note argues that before such development occurs, Congress should pass
legislation allowing adjacent coastal states to issue environmental assess-
ments of the full impact to their shores of development of wind power proj-
ects sited in federal waters. Further, this Note suggests such an analysis
should require a federal response to any negative impacts before additional
project approvals, thereby allowing states to exercise their role as public
trust arbiters while reserving ultimate jurisdiction of federal waters to the
federal government.
Such legislation is necessary in the wake of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court’s Alliance decision.33 The case illustrates how states can
yield their public trust responsibilities for sea resources to federal ad-
ministrative agencies with different and often highly specific regulatory
foci, leaving the public trust doctrine vulnerable and in danger of erosion.34
This Note will discuss how offshore projects in federally regulated waters
can negatively impact the lands and shores of neighboring states charged
with protecting those resources under the public trust.35 Additionally, it
will propose that state and federal regulations should allow for regulatory
agencies in states like Massachusetts to consider the full scope of a project’s
impact to their coasts even when such a project has little appreciable con-
nection to its physical jurisdiction.36
Specifically, Part I of this Note will detail the Cape Wind project
and its proposed benefit. Part II will discuss the Alliance decision and
dissent. Part III will outline considerations for siting offshore projects giv-
en the public trust roles of federal and state actors. Part IV will look at past
efforts to resolve tensions between federal and state siting prerogatives.
Part IV will also espouse a solution that will allow states to safeguard
public trust interests without stripping federal agencies of their jurisdic-
tional prerogatives.
Flyway,” a major migration path, that magnetic fields created by electric transmission
cables could interfere with aquatic species navigational abilities, and that turbine pilings
could form artificial reefs jeopardizing commercially valuable indigenous fish).
32 Ransom, supra note 31, at 657–58.
33 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 799–800 (Mass. 2010).
34 See infra Part II.
35 See infra Part III.A.
36 See infra Part III.B.
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I. THE CAPE WIND STORY
In many respects, the Cape Wind story represents a standard Not-
In-My-Backyard conflict. Professor Ronald Rosenberg’s generalization
about opposition to wind power could easily be a summary of the Cape
Wind saga:
Opponents of wind power usually do not dispute the benefits
of the technology. Rather, they frequently concentrate on
specific adverse environmental or natural resource impacts
of facility siting at particular locations. To them, wind-
generated power is a good thing as long as it is produced
somewhere else. These opponents have been characterized
as classic not in my backyard believers and those who would
stifle this emerging carbon-free electrical generation. The
points made by both sides in this sometimes contentious
debate have been wide-ranging and always deeply felt.37
But the Cape Wind story is slightly more nuanced in that the “backyard”
of the Nantucket Sound belongs to everybody under the earliest expres-
sions of the public trust doctrine in the Justinian Code, which recognizes
the natural law right of mankind to the sea and other natural resources.38
When a project is located in the midst of an ocean landscape, as is the case
with the Cape Wind offshore wind farm,39 it can tangentially impact half
the nation’s gross domestic product and more than half its population.40
Given its placement in so great a public resource, it follows that the
impact of this project, and similar ones, on this public resource should be
comprehensively evaluated.41
The Cape Wind project has made waves since its inception, al-
though it has not harnessed a single breeze to date.42 An enterprise of
37 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 658–59.
38 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 26, at 310.
39 Angela Couloumbis, A Proposed Wind Farm of Cape Cod Raises Howls; The Plan
Promises Clean Energy, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 5, 2003, at A1, available at http://
articles.philly.com/2003-08-05/news/25455355_1_wind-farm-cape-wind-associates
-nantucket-sound.
40 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL
REPORT 2 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents
/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf.
41 Id. at 367.
42 Jay Lindsay, Wanted: Buyer for Controversial Cape Wind Energy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 19, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2010/12/19/wanted_buyer
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power developer Jim Gordon,43 the Cape Wind project entails placing 130
wind turbines in the shallow waters of Horseshoe Shoal in the Nantucket
Sound, five miles from Hyannis and seven miles from Nantucket Island.44
The proposed 400-foot tall turbines would look half an inch tall on the
horizon from the closest shore.45 From an energy production perspective,
the shallow site with strong winds suited the project perhaps better than
any other site off U.S. shores.46 Turbines spaced half a mile apart would
be bolted in the ocean floor with steel pilings that would pump electricity
through an underwater cable to transmission lines on Cape Cod.47 The two
transmission lines would traverse the Nantucket Sound and Lewis Bay
under the seabed for 12.5 miles and, onshore, continue another 5.9 miles
underground through the towns of Yarmouth and Barnstable until cables
reach a switching station in Barnstable.48 Through these copper and fiber
optic cable lines,49 the project would have the capacity to generate 420
megawatts of electricity in federal waters as one of the largest offshore
energy projects in the world.50
As a two billion dollar investment,51 a sum which has at least
tripled from its initial investment estimate,52 the project promises renew-
able energy.53 But the energy does not come cheaply: electricity generated
_for_controversial_cape_wind_energy/ (reporting that the project has incurred a decade’s
worth of opposition well in advance of its projected 2012 start date).
43 Jeffrey Krasner, Offshore Wind Farm Blows into Cape View, BOSTON GLOBE, July 28,
2001, at A1 (noting that Gordon founded Energy Management, which developed power
plants in three New England states during the 1980s and then sold its holdings for $250
million before Gordon introduced the Cape Wind plan). Gordon formed Cape Wind
Associates with partners Brian Braginton-Smith, a Cape Cod native who had been ped-
dling the idea of a Cape Code wind farm for ten years, and Brian Caffyn, who ran a com-
pany that operated wind farms in Italy. Id. The three formed Cape Wind Associates in
2001. Id.
44 Id.; see also Project at a Glance, CAPEWIND.ORG, http://www.capewind.org/article24.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
45 Couloumbis, supra note 39.
46 Krasner, supra note 43.
47 Id.
48 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 792 (2010).
49 Id.
50 Greg Watson & Fara Courtney, Nantucket Sound Offshore Wind Stakeholder Process,
31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 264 (2004).
51 Jay Fitzgerald, Cape Wind Rate Shock; Electricity Will Cost Twice as Much as Power
Plants, BOSTON HERALD, May 8, 2010, at Finance 14.
52 Id.; see also Krasner, supra note 43.
53 Project at a Glance, supra note 44.
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from the plant will cost twice as much as energy generated from other
sources.54 Although it would add only about five cents per day to rate-
payers’ electric bills, due to its high cost, the Cape Wind project would qual-
ify for $600 million in taxpayer subsidies.55
High energy cost is only one objection to the project.56 Despite its in-
troduction into a cultural milieu of the Kyoto protocols,57 renewable energy
credits, and increasing concern about climate change,58 the project imme-
diately encountered criticisms due to its disruption of the horizon and po-
tential impacts on boating.59 Project opponents mounted a host of other
environmental, constitutional, practical, and aesthetic concerns as well.60
Proposed in the summer of 2001,61 the project is now closing in on
a decade of administrative approvals and relentless resistance.62 For
example, the project received the nation’s first ever offshore wind lease
in October 2010,63 furnishing it with a needed step toward its goal of gen-
erating as much as seventy-five percent of Cape Cod’s energy demand.64
In the same month, project opponents filed another lawsuit complaining
of government delay in satisfying a request for public documents.65 And
the battle to erect Cape Wind continues: the Massachusetts Department
of Public Utilities approved a fifteen-year contract between Cape Wind
and electrical service provider National Grid for the latter to purchase
fifty percent of the wind project’s power, concluding that the deal would
benefit consumers.66
54 Fitzgerald, supra note 51; see also Giordano, supra note 18, at 1152–53 (noting that
electricity from offshore projects would cost twice as much as energy derived from land-
based wind farms).
55 Fitzgerald, supra note 51.
56 See, e.g., Steve LeBlanc, Group Challenges Wind Power Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14,
2010, at B6.
57 Watson & Courtney, supra note 50, at 264.
58 Id. at 264–65.
59 Krasner, supra note 43.
60 Watson & Courtney, supra note 50, at 265 (noting that opponents of the project objected
to the “industrialization” of Cape Cod, impacts to birds, navigation, marine life, tourism,
property values, and the private, commercial use of public waters).
61 Krasner, supra note 43.
62 See Beth Daley, Cape Wind Awarded the Nation’s First Offshore Wind Farm Lease,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2010, at B4.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Wind Farm Opponents Sue for Documents, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 2010, at B2.
66 Press Release, Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Utilities, Department of Public Utilities Approves
Contract for Offshore Wind Power (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.mass.gov
/?pageID=eoeeapressrelease&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Eoeea&b=pressrelease&f=101122_pr
_cape_wind&csid=Eoeea.
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However, project opponents continue to contest project approvals.67
In the midst of this ongoing battle, and before this project and others be-
come operational, perhaps an assessment of whether the complaints of the
dissenting voices, insofar as they decry the erosion of citizens’ interests in
the siting of offshore wind farms, is merited. More specifically, the project
spurs the question of whether the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision
in Alliance68 denotes administrative ambivalence toward the interests cir-
cumscribed by the public trust doctrine in the nation’s first offshore wind
farm?69 And, further, does the decision carve out a pattern at risk of being
followed by other states?
II. THE DECISION
The Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision in Alliance materi-
alized after the defendant Board approved Cape Wind Associates’ petition
to build and operate two underground, underwater electric transmission
cables.70 The approval, granted in 2005, would allow Cape Wind to connect
the wind turbines to the onshore, regional electric grid.71 The court affirmed
the approval of the Board based on its authority under Massachusetts
General Laws, chapter 164, § 69J.72 That provision states in relevant
part that:
Any electric, gas, or oil company proposing to construct or
operate facilities in the commonwealth may petition the
board for a certificate of environmental impact and public
interest with respect to such facility. The board shall con-
sider such petition providing: the electric, gas or oil com-
pany is prevented from building a facility because it cannot
meet standards imposed by a state or local agency with
commercially available equipment or because the process-
ing or granting by a state or local agency of any approval,
67 Beth Daley, EPA Cape Wind Air Permit Challenged, THE GREEN BLOG (Feb. 14, 2011,
08:25 PM), http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/green/greenblog/2011/02/epa_cape_wind_air
_permit_chall.html (reporting that the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound and tribal
groups have appealed the Environmental Protection Agency’s recent approval for emis-
sions during construction).
68 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 815–16 (Mass. 2010) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
69 Krasner, supra note 43.
70 Id. at 665.
71 Id.
72 Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 § 69J (West 2011).
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consent, permit or certificate has been unduly delayed for
any reason . . . ; or the electric, gas or oil company believes
there are inconsistencies among resource use permits is-
sued by such state or local agencies; or the electric, gas or
oil company believes that a nonregulatory issue or condi-
tion has been raised or imposed by such state or local agen-
cies such as but not limited to aesthetics and recreation;
or the facility cannot be constructed due to any disapprovals,
conditions or denials by a state or local agency or body, ex-
cept with respect to any lands or interests therein, exclud-
ing public ways, owned or managed by any state agency or
local government.73
Based on this provision, Cape Wind Associates applied for a consolidated
petition because the Cape Cod Commission, which serves as the land use
and regulatory agency of Barnstable County, Massachusetts,74 unanimously
denied a necessary permit for the project.75 The denial was based on a “lack
of information,” despite the fact that the plan had been under review for six
years.76 Expressing approval of the Cape Cod Commission’s decision, op-
ponents of the project remarked that, of all of the regulatory agencies
involved in the project, the Commission cared most about the interests of
Cape Cod.77 After the denial, Cape Wind applied for a streamlined ap-
proval process through Massachusetts’s Energy Facilities Siting Board
rather than appeal directly to the Commission.78 Newspapers called the
move an “end run around local permit battles.”79 The Siting Board granted
the permit, giving rise to the appeal that ultimately landed before the
Massachusetts Supreme Court.80 In affirming the Siting Board’s decision,
73 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (West 2011).
74 CCC Act, CAPE COD COMMISSION, http://www.capecodcommission.org/index.php?id=15
&maincatid=2 (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
75 Stephanie Ebbert, Cape Cod Panel Denies Permit for Wind Farm, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19,
2007, at A1 (reporting in the lead paragraph that “A proposed Nantucket Sound wind farm
that has garnered international attention went before its toughest arbiter yesterday—the
locals—and lost, as a commission charged with protecting Cape Cod’s natural resources
denied the project a permit.”); Jennifer Zajac, Cape Cod Commission Denies Permit to Cape
Wind, SNL POWER DAILY NORTHEAST, Oct. 22, 2007.
76 Zajac, supra note 75.
77 Id.
78 Stephanie Ebbert, Cape Wind Seeks to Skip Permit Wars, Pressing State for Streamlined
Process, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 2007, at B1.
79 Id.
80 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 795 (Mass. 2010).
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the Supreme Court noted that Massachusetts’s permit approval consid-
ered not the entire wind farm, but only the portions of the project physi-
cally located within Massachusetts territory, reciting in its opinion the
following explanation of this fact by the Secretary of the Executive Office
of Energy and Environmental Affairs:
Because M[assachusetts] E[nvironmental] P[olicy] A[ct]
(like the Cape Cod Commission Act) is the product of state
law, not federal law, MEPA review (and by extension
Cape Cod Commission review) applies only to those por-
tions of the project that are located within Massachusetts,
including its territorial waters (generally within three nau-
tical miles of the low water mark of the shore). The pro-
posed [wind farm] is located outside of Massachusetts and,
therefore, is not subject to state regulatory requirements.
There is one notable exception . . . . [F]ederal law (pursu-
ant to the Coastal Zone Management Act) specifically del-
egates review authority over projects in federal waters
to the Coastal Zone Management Office of the adjacent
coastal state . . . .81
The petitioners asserted that the Siting Board was obliged to consider the
in-state impacts of the entire wind farm, not just of the cables within
Massachusetts’s physical jurisdiction.82 Specifically, they asserted the
Siting Board was obliged to consider “impacts of the wind farm’s turbine
generators on ‘state waters, air space, lands, and public safety’ ” because of
allegations that the wind farm would harm “navigation, aviation, fisheries,
birds, and water quality, as well as create an increased set of risks relating
to public safety and environmental damage that a town such as Barnstable
will be forced to confront.”83
The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected this claim for two
reasons: first, because the definition of “facility” under review by the Siting
Board explicitly encompassed only the transmission lines,84 and, secondly,
81 Id. at 792 n.6.
82 Id. at 803.
83 Id. at 803 n.31.
84 Id. at 803–04.
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because the project in federal waters enjoyed exclusive federal jurisdiction.85
On this latter point, the court noted that:
the express assertion of exclusive Federal power and
control over the outer continental shelf, defined in the
O[uter] C[ontinental] S[helf] L[ands] A[ct] as all sub-
merged lands lying in navigable waters beyond three
miles from shore,86 . . . serves to preempt any attempt by
the Commonwealth or its agencies to regulate structures
or facilities placed in that area.87
To hold otherwise would give states veto power over disposition of the
seabed in contravention of the Outer Continental Shelf Act.88 By consid-
ering the impact of the transmission cables only, the court said that the
state discharged its public trust doctrine obligations.89
Petitioners also claimed that the Energy Facilities Siting Board
improperly granted Cape Wind a tidelands license among its consoli-
dated approvals because it lacked the requisite grant of authority from
the legislature to act in connection with the state’s tidelands, which are
“both owned and held in trust by the Commonwealth to protect the public’s
rights in them.”90 The court held that the legislature did imbue the Siting
Board with public trust responsibilities and, therefore, it validly acted with
respect to Massachusetts’s tidelands in issuing the tidelands permit.91
The court further noted that Siting Board could “stand in the shoes” of
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection in consider-
ing public trust implications of issuing the requisite permits.92 “There is
no mention of public trust rights or obligations in § 69K,93 but there does
not need to be,” the court noted, referencing the provision that allows the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, as the statutory
85 Id. at 804.
86 See 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2) (2006).
87 Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 804.
88 Id. at 804–05.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 798.
91 Id. at 800.
92 Id.
93 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (West 2011).
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guardian of the state’s public trust resources, to delegate that responsi-
bility to the Siting Board.94 Explaining, the court noted that:
[t]he Legislature has designated DEP as the agency charged
with responsibility for protecting public trust rights in tide-
lands through the c. 91 licensing program,95 and where a
tidelands license is necessary for a proposed facility, the
Legislature has, in § 69K,96 expressly vested authority in
the siting board to act in DEP’s stead with respect to the
initial permitting decision.97
Although it concluded that the Siting Board possessed legislatively dele-
gated authority to determine public trust impacts,98 significantly, the court
did not discuss the Siting Board’s capacity to make public trust impact de-
terminations on behalf of the Department of Environmental Protection,99
except to note that certain positions within the DEP overlap with key po-
sitions on the Siting Board, allowing the DEP to continue playing a role in
the management of even its delegated authority.100 Furthermore, the court
did not note whether the record in fact indicated that the Siting Board con-
sidered the public trust implications of granting a permit.101
Amid other legislative contentions, petitioners also claimed the
Siting Board could have found a hook to review the entire Wind Farm
project under a provision requiring conformity of Siting Board projects
with existing law and the reasonableness of exemption from the ordinary
permitting process.102 However, the court concluded, as before, that this
provision “does not trump the exclusivity of Federal” jurisdiction over the
project.103 As a result, the court found that while the Siting Board could
act as Massachusetts’s public trust agent, the state was preempted from
considering total impact of the wind farm because such consideration
94 Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 799.
95 Tidelands Jurisdiction (M.G.L. c.91), OFFICE OF GEOGRAPHIC INFO., http://www.mass.gov
/mgis/tidelands.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
96 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (West 2011).
97 Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 799–800.
98 Id. at 801–02.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 800–01 n.29.
101 See id.
102 Id. at 813.
103 See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 813.
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“would be tantamount to” veto power of the project, thereby infringing on
federal prerogative.104
A. Dissent
While four justices signed the majority’s decision,105 Chief Justice
Margaret H. Marshall, with whom Justice Francis X. Spina joined,
dissented on the grounds that the decision undermined the public trust
doctrine.106 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that
the Energy Facilities Siting Board had authority to act as dispositor of
Massachusetts’s coastal areas and warned about far-reaching implica-
tions of the decision, noting, “[a] wind farm today may be a drilling rig or
nuclear power plant tomorrow.”107 It further recognized the potentially
dire consequences of failing to consider the implications of federally gov-
erned projects on adjacent states’ coasts.108 Such lapses could inadver-
tently jeopardize the public trust covenant between Massachusetts and
its citizens.109 Relevant to this discussion, Marshall wrote:
The public trust doctrine and government energy policy are
not at odds. Indeed, they are complementary. Both express
the people’s paramount interest in the wise and fruitful use
of natural resources. Today’s opinion, however, casts these
two allies in opposition, and exalts regulatory expediency
at the cost of fiduciary obligation. By issuing a certificate
pursuant to G.L. c. 164, § 69K, which purports to include
the “equivalent” of a G.L. c. 91 tidelands license, the siting
board has purported to act as the protector of the public’s
long-standing rights under the public trust doctrine with-
out the necessary express legislative authority to do so. Its
usurpation of the Commonwealth’s fiduciary responsibility
to the people, and DEP’s complicit agreement with that
usurpation, should not be condoned. Moreover, even if the
siting board had the authority to act, it has failed to exer-
cise its role of fiduciary on behalf of the public because it
failed to consider the in-State impacts of the wind farm.110
104 Id. at 804–05.
105 See id.
106 Id. at 815 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
107 Id. at 816.
108 Id.
109 Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 816.
110 Id. at 824.
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Regardless of whether the Siting Board had authority to act, the dissent
concluded that the Commonwealth failed to discharge its public trust
duties. The majority, however, felt the state could not discharge those
duties without infringing on clearly established federal grants of power,
presumably leaving the public trust responsibilities to be the bailiwick
of the regulating federal agencies.111
III. THE PROBLEM
A. Who is Defending the Public Trust?
One of the first problems with the Alliance court’s decision is that
it relieved the state from public trust responsibilities, presumably shifting
that responsibility to the federal government agencies with jurisdiction
over the bulk of the project.112 Ocean-based renewable energy development
presents an even greater challenge to the government’s application of the
public trust doctrine.113 In the Cape Wind decision, it is unclear what state
agency is considering the project’s impact on the public trust,114 although
those involved agree it merits consideration.115 If, as Massachusetts’s
highest court declared, states are preempted from this task,116 how much
greater will be the vagueness surrounding federal responsibility for it? For
instance, not until 2009—eight years after the project was underway—
did federal agencies allocate responsibility for the project.117 As one au-
thor notes, agencies tasked with regulating renewable energy develop-
ment need coordination to act cohesively and effectively in the renewable
energy arena.118 In fact, the federal government itself, through the U.S.
111 Id. at 804 (majority opinion).
112 See id.
113 Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights
and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 369 (2006). Osherenko notes, “[n]ew uses,
such as offshore renewable-energy development; open-water aquaculture; offshore, floating,
LNG terminals; and mining of deep-sea vents would present a challenge for government
trustees as each would entail closure of some areas to public access.” Id.
114 See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 803–04 (indicating that some confusion existed regarding
which agency, if any, could consider the project’s impact).
115 See id. at 817.
116 Id. at 804.
117 Giordano, supra note 18, at 1158–59 (noting that the Minerals Management Service
(“MMS”) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission disputed the jurisdiction over the
Cape Wind project until signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 2009 that gave MMS
jurisdiction over offshore wind farms).
118 See Sanya Carleyolsen, Tangled in the Wires: An Assessment of the Existing U.S.
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Commission on Ocean Policy, has called for a comprehensive overhaul of
regulatory oversight of offshore wind development.119 As part of that
recommendation, the commission’s report specifically calls for legislation
providing for comprehensive offshore management that is both based on
the premise that the oceans are a public resource and considers state,
local, and public concerns.120 But, as of yet, “there is no comprehensive and
coordinated federal regime in place to regulate offshore wind energy devel-
opment or to convey property rights to use the public space of the [Outer
Continental Shelf] for this purpose.”121
Further, one need look only to the example of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill to see the potential for negative consequences due to
such a lack of coordinated federal management of offshore activities.122
A presidential panel investigating the spill concluded that “the accident
and subsequent oil spill were the result of a cascade of management
failures, regulatory oversights, missed signals and time-saving shortcuts
that combined to take eleven lives and produce the worst offshore oil re-
lease in the nation’s history.”123 Leaving the responsibility for the public
trust to trickle through such administrative lapses in future offshore devel-
opment would render Chief Justice Marshall’s dissent ominously prescient:
“The court’s ruling to the contrary establishes a dangerous and unwise
precedent, which has far-reaching consequences. A wind farm today may
be a drilling rig or nuclear power plant tomorrow.”124
B. Who Should Be Guarding the Public Trust?
To avoid such management failures and lack of regulatory over-
sight in future offshore development, change is needed. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court did not have a law providing for a state-generated envi-
ronmental impact statement of the entire project,125 and resultantly, they
Renewable Energy Legal Framework, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 759, 781–82 (2006).
119 See U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 40, at 368.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 368.




124 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 816 (Mass. 2010).
125 See id. at 813 (indicating that in-state impacts were not “reasonable” and thus were
preempted by federal review).
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might not have had the right tools in their shed to reach a result that would
preserve their role as public trust doctrine guardians.126 Yet, they did have
indirect legislative direction that the state wanted to preserve its role as
public trust guardian as a result of Massachusetts’s Ocean Act of 2008
(“the Act”).127
The Act provided for an “ocean management plan” to manage the
Commonwealth’s waters and submerged lands in accordance with the pub-
lic trust doctrine, but it did not allow for contemplation of projects outside
the Commonwealth’s coastal waters.128 The seaward boundary of each
coastal state is three miles from its coast.129 Thus, the Act does not con-
template the Cape Shore wind project,130 but it illustrates how compre-
hensive governance of projects like offshore wind farms is challenging
when the states control waters three miles out and the federal govern-
ment regulates waters beyond the three-mile mark.131
Massachusetts legislators touted the plan as a form of ocean zon-
ing that would allow the state to balance ocean development and natural
resources according to a statewide plan instead of on a patchwork, case-
by-case basis.132 According to the text of the Act, the express intention of
the plan is that “[t]he ocean waters and ocean-based development of the
commonwealth, within the ocean management planning area described in
this section, shall be under the oversight, coordination and planning au-
thority of the secretary of energy and environmental affairs, hereinafter
referred to as the secretary, in accordance with the public trust doctrine.”133
Despite this explicit alignment of ocean development with the public trust
doctrine, the Act falls short of allowing Massachusetts to assess the public
126 See id. Because the court determined that the in-state impacts were unreasonable, this
may have inhibited the Commonwealth’s ability to argue for preservation of its role over
the public trust doctrine.
127 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21A, § 4C (West 2011).
128 Id.
129 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006).
130 See generally Katie Zezima, Massachusetts Law to Manage and Protect Ocean Waters,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A15.
131 PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE
26 (May 2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg
/Reports/Protecting_ocean_life/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf (noting how the bifurcation
of regulatory authority complicates comprehensive ocean governance). Beyond the state’s
three-mile territorial sea, the federal sovereignty over the seas extends twelve miles, though
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas grants federal governments exclusive
control over ocean resources up to 200 miles from their shores. Id.
132 See id; Zezima, supra note 130, at A15.
133 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21A, § 4C (West 2011).
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trust doctrine impacts of projects outside of the state’s territorial waters
because it encompasses only those projects located within them.134 Nor
could the state of Massachusetts exert jurisdiction over projects located
primarily in federal waters absent a waiver or delegation of federal au-
thority to the adjacent coastal state.135
Still, the Act garnered praise as a step in the right direction towards
more cohesive management of the nation’s sea resources, as called for by a
2003 Pew Ocean Commission report,136 which provides part of a possible
solution to allowing adjacent coastal states to command a response to nega-
tive impacts of projects in federal waters off their shores.137 The report calls
for the federal government to revamp federal ocean laws to better protect
ocean resources in the face of increasing ocean development.138 The report
noted that “[t]he principal laws to protect our coastal zones, endangered
marine mammals, ocean waters, and fisheries were enacted thirty years
ago, on a crisis-by-crisis, sector-by-sector basis.”139 The result has rendered
chaos for ocean management: “[p]lagued with systemic problems, U.S.
ocean governance is in disarray.”140 The current state of affairs prompted
the Commission to call for reformation of the federal government’s relation-
ship to ocean resources, with the report noting, “[m]ost importantly, we
must treat our oceans as a public trust.”141 The report advocates imple-
menting ocean zoning guided by a National Ocean Policy Act and admin-
istered by regional authorities.142
Implementing the Pew Ocean Commission’s recommendations
would aggrandize the Massachusetts Ocean Act of 2008 by installing a
comprehensive ocean management policy and consequent zoning,143 admin-
istered through regional councils.144 While the plan calls for participation
from various government officials and a broad range of stakeholders,145 it
134 See id. (noting that these provisions only apply to development within the
Commonwealth).
135 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (2006) (authorizing the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to
allocate power to states to implement their own coastal management programs).
136 Zezima, supra note 130.
137 See PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 131, at 57–58 (noting that the Report recom-
mends that states create and enforce water quality standards).
138 Id. at x–xi.
139 Id. at vii.
140 Id. at viii.
141 Id. at x.
142 Id. at 34.
143 See Zezima, supra note 130.
144 PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 131, at 33.
145 Id. at 103.
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creates new governmental bodies146 at the expense of bypassing existing
governmental zoning structures rooted in the American tradition of local
land use governance.147
This is perhaps detrimental to states’ roles as public trust guardians
when local governments, who traditionally hold such zoning authority,148
are situated nearest the project and, resultantly, may be best attuned to the
negative externalities of offshore projects and most cognizant of the public’s
interest in those resources affected by a particular offshore project.149 As
discussed below, and as illustrated by the Cape Wind conflict, shifting
ocean zoning authority to a new federal agency, even one peppered with
local stakeholders, might aggravate existing tensions between offshore
development, national policy considerations, and an American tradition
of local control.
IV. SITING THE POWER AS KEY TO SITING WIND FARMS AND OTHER
OFFSHORE PROJECTS
Perhaps contributing to the Cape Wind conflict is the dissonance
between the presupposition of local land use controls and national policy
advancement. The latent tension between local land use control and
national policy objectives could be mitigated by a cohesive national oce-
anic policy and consequent zoning, as suggested by the Pew Commission
report.150 A national ocean policy that heeds the traditional structure of
American zoning governance may both chill paralyzing conflict and elevate
discourse regarding appropriate offshore development.151 The concept of
local control over what space is used for what purpose has deep-seated ori-
gins in local governance: as Rosenberg suggests, “[t]he practice of state and
146 Id. at 33–34.
147 See R. Seth Davis, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of
Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPACT, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404,
426 (2008) (noting that states have historically regulated land use, utilities, and local
eminent domain).
148 See Frank B. Cross, The Folly Of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 30 (noting that police
protection, sanitation, and zoning are part of a myriad of local government functions).
149 See, e.g., Ransom, supra note 31 (citing negative impacts noted by neighbors and oppo-
nents of offshore wind farms).
150 PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 131, at 33–34.
151 See Davis, supra note 147, at 450 (noting that the federal government can preempt states’
voices in electric facilities siting process by withdrawing a regulatory scheme altogether).
Instead, the author recommends that “[t]he Court should require Congress, when it threat-
ens conditional preemption, to allow states to still have input into, though not control over,
the resulting federal preemptive regulation.” Id.
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local government supremacy over direct land utilization has strong support
in American concepts of federalism and enacting federal preemption would
interfere with traditional land use control authority and would likely be
very politically unpopular in many parts of the United States.”152 Clearly,
the Cape Wind project has illustrated how unpopular removing local control
from significant development can be.153
Perhaps the resistance to surrendering local control comes with
good reason. Zoning powers were delegated to states, which in turn dele-
gated such powers to municipalities and counties,154 due to federalism’s
assumption that decision-making should occur at the most local level with
capacity to solve the problem at issue.155 Whether local governments have
the “capacity” to exhaustively analyze the impacts of an offshore wind farm
might be arguable given that their perspective is often limited to localized
concerns156 at the expense of broader concerns, like a national interest in
encouraging renewable energy generation.157
Additionally, a community’s rapid decision-making processes may
too hastily assess project impacts, thereby permitting long-term harm.158
Control over zoning and implementation of renewable energy infrastruc-
ture traditionally lies with local governments, which consequently can use
their role to promote national renewable energy goals.159 Clearly, this was
not the case with the Cape Cod Commission, which delayed project approv-
als with seemingly insatiable requests for information.160
While these concerns are valid,161 the same rationale for seating
decision-making power closest to those it affects would seem to suggest
that communities can capably assess the particular project impacts affect-
ing their shores, navigable waterways, and citizens, thereby supporting
152 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 671–72.
153 See LeBlanc, supra note 56 (noting that the Cape Wind project is one of the most litigated
public utilities projects in the state’s history).
154 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning § 7 (2010).
155 Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 511 (2007).
156 See Ebbert, supra note 75 (noting the Cape Code Commission—the local agency that
denied a permit to Cape Wind—has “a reputation for being extremely stringent in assessing
developers’ plans”).
157 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 678.
158 Id. at 674.
159 Carleyolsen, supra note 118, at 781–82.
160 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 793 (Mass. 2010) (noting the Cape Cod Commission’s multiple public hearings, deadline
extensions for further consideration, and requests for additional information in reviewing
the Cape Wind project).
161 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 674.
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the assertion that local governments should have some command of how
spaces surrounding them are used. For instance, local communities have
staged complaints that radiation from wind turbines could pollute the
water and that turbine supports could attract jellyfish populations that
would cause a corresponding decrease in fish, thereby affecting local
fishermen.162 Without local fishermen to raise these concerns impacting
their livelihood, this negative impact, however small, to the biodiversity
of the proposed project site might not be so zealously emphasized.
Also, corollary to the proposition that community oversight of proj-
ect impacts leads to parochial decision-making163 is that state and federal
agencies may not make decisions in the best interests of individual com-
munities in an effort to achieve broader policy goals. This is especially true
when federal and state alternatives to local decision-making stand to re-
ceive significant revenues from the proposed projects. This is the case in
the Cape Wind project, where a twenty-eight year lease for operating off-
shore wind turbines will generate $88,278 in annual federally assessed
fees, more when the project becomes operational, twenty-seven percent of
which will go to the Massachusetts commonwealth.164 In times of shrink-
ing public budgets, such inducements might sway policy makers, even
inadvertently, towards project approval while understating negative
project impacts.165 Because those closest to the project may best be able
to articulate negative policy impacts,166 local governments should play an
active role in articulating negative externalities from offshore develop-
ment projects as part of a state’s fulfillment of its role as guardian of the
public trust.
While local governments should play an active role by guiding
development of projects in federal waters, national policy goals could be
too easily thwarted if local communities, or even states, held veto power
for offshore projects marginally impacting their shores, despite the fact
that such projects promise renewable energy benefits to a much larger
162 Hayden, supra note 28, at 229.
163 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 675.
164 Patrick Cassidy, Offshore Wind Farm Lease Now Official, CAPE COD TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010,
http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20101007/NEWS/10070315
/-1/NEWSLETTER100.
165 Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”:
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 182–83 (1996).
166 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal Innovation in Ecosystem Management:
Perspectives from American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 745, 750–51 (1997).
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segment of the population than resides within their town lines.167 While
understanding the Alliance dissent’s warning against polarizing the stew-
ardship of ocean resources with furtherance of national energy policy
goals,168 it is important to note that the public trust doctrine should not
be commandeered in the name of many to serve the private desires of a
few,169 a charge Cape Wind project opponents have encountered in their
opposition to the project.170 Yet in cases where competing values stake a
claim to public trust doctrine arguments, such policy tensions are perhaps
best left to resolution by the people, to whom powers are reserved by the
Constitution’s Ninth and Tenth Amendments.171 Resolving these
overarching policy conflicts could well be done through a comprehensive
revamping of ocean legislation as suggested by the Pew Commission172
and as recommended by the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.173
Given the need for federal policy to establish a comprehensive off-
shore wind power regulatory scheme,174 the siting of offshore projects lo-
cated in federal territorial waters should well be the prerogative of federal
administrative agencies.175 Yet, to best resolve the tension between the
benefits and tradition of local oversight and the need for efficacy in imple-
menting a comprehensive national policy,176 heed should be given to the
state’s role in enforcing the public trust doctrine177 and, consequently, to
negative externalities flagged by those trustees of the public trust as pro-
vided for by statutes like the Massachusetts Ocean Act of 2008.178 To
achieve this framework of complete federal jurisdiction concordant with
the state’s public trust role, Congress can act on the U.S. Commission on
167 See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 675.
168 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787, 824 (Mass. 2010).
169 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 26, at 317.
170 See, e.g., Williams & Whitcomb, supra note 15, at xxiv.
171 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 26, at 317.
172 See PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 131.
173 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 40, at 1.
174 Id. at 366 (noting the lack of a coordinated federal regime).
175 See Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power
As an Alternative Energy Source in the United States: Creative and Comparative Solutions,
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 535, 535–36 (2007).
176 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 674–75.
177 See, e.g., MASS. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MGMT., THE OCEAN AS A PUBLIC TRUST
RESOURCE, http://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/waves_of_change/pdf/trpt.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2011) (representing Massachusetts’s conception of its public trust
responsibilities).
178 See ch. 21A, § 4C, supra note 127.
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Ocean Policy’s recommendation to strengthen partnerships with non-
federal agencies, particularly states, to manage off shore development.179
How to do this raises another discussion.
V. BALANCING STATE STAKES AND FEDERAL RIGHTS
A. Borrowing from Previous Efforts
Offshore development is not the first harbinger of the tensions
between local control and national policy in facility siting.180 As
Rosenberg notes:
Analogies where federal law [has] preempted state law in
matters of facility siting do exist. For instance, § 704 of the
1996 Telecommunications Act dealt with the local govern-
ment regulation of the location of cellular telephone towers.
There, to neutralize local NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) sen-
timent that would block the establishment of a national
communications network, Congress recognized limited sub-
stantive grounds for the denial of local siting permission. In
addition, it created federal court jurisdiction to consider re-
jected or delayed siting requests and to order approval.181
In fact, the Telecommunications Act has specifically been summoned as
a pattern for eliminating conflict from offshore wind farm projects.182 Of
significance is the fact that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 chose to
waive some of its federal prerogative in working with the existing zoning
frameworks of would-be host communities to cell phone towers.183 As one
179 U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 40, at 360 (noting recommendations “to
strengthen the coordination of ocean policy at the federal level, but also to increase the in-
volvement of nonfederal governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders” and “to signifi-
cantly enhance the ocean and coastal partnership between the federal government and state,
territorial, tribal, and local governments,” recognizing that “much of the responsibility
for managing the nation’s ocean and coastal resources rests with nonfederal authorities”).
180 See Hayden, supra note 28, at 226.
181 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 671.
182 See Hayden, supra note 28, at 226; Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1092 (2009).
183 Hayden, supra note 28, at 232.
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author on the subject notes, “[f]ederal legislation could have completely pre-
empted the laws of the state and local governments which dealt with cel-
lular towers but chose not to, instead allowing those entities to express
their values within certain federally created constraints.”184
Allowing communities to zone according to their own values without
preempting national policy goals facilitates the siting of cell phone towers
under the Telecommunications Act.185 However, significant differences be-
tween cell towers and offshore wind farms may make it an imperfectly anal-
ogous template for offshore development. A significant difference is that
those projects located in federal territorial waters would be developed in
waters three miles off any state’s coast186 rather than within the commu-
nities themselves, and to give local communities exclusive zoning rights
may result in locality-centric zoning that would counter the public trust
proposition that ocean resources belong to the people at large, not exclu-
sively to those that reside near its coasts.187
While providing for local guidance of offshore development, in keep-
ing with traditional American land governance customs, is crucial to help-
ing states fulfill their role as public trust arbitrators, granting localities the
ability to restrict projects in federal waters would place the interest of the
public at large in the hands of the few. Thus, while the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 instructs on the importance of waiving some federal preroga-
tives in order to include local governments in the development of offshore
projects,188 it is an incomplete model for resolving the tensions between
safeguarding the public trust and promoting national policy in favor of
renewable energy.
B. Towards a Future Offshore Framework
How then can states and local communities be allowed to assess the
full impact of offshore projects on their coasts, thereby better registering
erosion to the public’s interest in ocean resources, while preserving federal
jurisdiction of projects within federal waters? I propose the answer lies in
allowing states and, through their delegated power, their communities
to analyze the impact of the entire offshore project through their inde-
pendently generated environmental assessments as required under the
184 Id.
185 Id. at 230–32.
186 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1337(g)(7) (2006).
187 See MASS. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MGMT., supra note 177.
188 Hayden, supra note 28, at 232.
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National Environmental Policy Act.189 To understand why the act needs
alteration, however, one must first understand the legislative landscape
of the relevant provisions.
In the first place, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the
Department of the Interior to grant leases, easements, and rights-of-way to
lands on the Outer Continental Shelf for activities that promote energy pro-
duction from sources other than gas and oil.190 Thus, this law allows the fed-
eral government to cede control of offshore areas to private parties.191 The
Cape Wind project’s need for a lease from the Department of the Interior’s
Mineral Management Service (“MMS,” now the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement)192 prompted the federal govern-
ment’s environmental review of the project through an Environmental
Impact Statement as required under the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”).193 Under NEPA, the lead federal agency was responsible
for preparing the review,194 which was done independently of the adja-
cent coastal state of Massachusetts.195 As expected with so controversial
and publicized a project, the Cape Wind project spurred copious amounts
of public participation in the project, receiving more than 42,000 com-
ments as the MMS compiled its Environmental Impact Statement.196 The
MMS logged and responded to each of these comments197 before issuing
189 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).
190 MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CAPE WIND ENERGY
PROJECT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT E-1 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter CAPE
WIND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT], available at http://www.boemre
.gov/offshore/RenewableEnergy/CapeWindFEIS.htm.
191 Id.
192 Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, AND
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/newweb/frequentlyaskedquestions/frequently
askedquestions.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
193 CAPE WIND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 190, at E-1. In fact,
the Minerals Management Service’s Environmental Impact Statement was the second
environmental review triggered by NEPA. A prior draft EIS had been issued by the Army
Corps of Engineers before the Energy Policy Act of 2005 transferred lead federal regulatory
authority from the Army Corps of Engineers to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, and Enforcement (formerly the Minerals Management Service) within the
Department of the Interior. Id.
194 Id.
195 Permitting Update, CAPEWIND.ORG, http://www.capewind.org/article72.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
196 CAPE WIND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 190, at E-5.
197 MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CAPE WIND ASSOCIATES FINAL
RECORD OF DECISION, at 3 (Apr. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAPE WIND FINAL RECORD OF
DECISION], available at http://www.boemre.gov/offshore/RenewableEnergy/PDFs/Cape
WindROD.pdf.
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a commercial lease granting Cape Wind Associates exclusive use of the
leased area subject to lease conditions.198
Although the federal review yielded enormous public participation,
which undoubtedly highlighted the public’s interest in the use of the project
area,199 it did not specifically address the state’s interest in preserving
the public trust.200 While it addressed many of the issues, like fishing and
navigation, which often are associated with the public’s interest,201 MMS
did not look at the project to assess whether the use and impact of the
analyzed categories comported with the public’s interest in stewarding
those resources.202
Because MMS has no such public trust role, this function could
have been accomplished had the state issued an analysis of the project
specifically analyzing whether the project best served the public’s inter-
est in its resources. Instead, the project was analyzed with a cost-benefit
approach to the national energy goals.203 The Record of Decision granting
approval of the lease noted that “the Department finds that the benefits
to the American public justify the lease offer for the Project on Horseshoe
Shoal in the Nantucket Sound,”204 citing an expectation that approving
a lease for the nation’s first offshore wind energy facility would spur
change in national energy trends.205 In addition, the Environmental
Impact Statement concluded that most of the anticipated impacts were
minor or negligible, with a few exceptions for possible minor-to-moderate
impacts to birds resulting from operation of the project.206 The Department
198 Id. at 4.
199 See CAPE WIND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 190, at E-5
(noting that over 42,000 comments were received).
200 See CAPE WIND FINAL RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 197, at 5. (noting the decision to
approve the Cape Wind lease came after assessing impacts to geology, noise, oceanographic
processes, climate and meteorology, air quality, water quality, electric and magnetic fields,
terrestrial vegetation, coastal and intertidal vegetation, terrestrial and ocean faunas other
than birds, avifauna, subtidal offshore resources, non-ESA marine mammals, fisheries,
essential fish habitat, threatened and endangered species, socioeconomic resources and land
use, population and economics, environmental justice, visual resources, cultural resources,
recreation and tourism, navigation and transportation, airport facilities and aviation traffic,
navigational safety, and communications).
201 See MASS. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MGMT., supra note 177.
202 CAPE WIND FINAL RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 197, at 5–6 (noting that the decision
is to be made after government-to-government consultation with affected Indian tribes, but
making no mention of consultation with state governments).
203 See id. at 5.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 CAPE WIND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 190, at E-12.
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of the Interior’s environmental review of the project granted the commercial
ocean lease after a cost-benefit analysis of the project, concluding that the
project’s significant benefit favored ceding exclusive control of the project
area to Cape Wind Associates.207
Stating the project in terms of costs and benefits, however, may den-
igrate the government’s duty to manage the public trust in ocean resources
to a tradable commodity, which may serve the purposes of the involved fed-
eral agency while inadvertently bypassing public trust considerations.208
This problem may be mitigated by allowing states to conduct an assessment
of an offshore wind project, which would be beneficial for several reasons,
according to Rosenberg:
State agencies can formulate a more structured process for
consideration of siting approval following a model of
decisionmaking having an information-based assessment,
a hearing and a final decision. With this clear administra-
tive structure, interested parties would have a better idea of
the basis for the decision to approve or disapprove of the
siting proposal. In addition, the state agency would be more
likely to have the institutional competence to assess the
project’s impacts. Its personnel would be more likely to have
the education and training in general environmental impact
analysis as well as in the analysis of socioeconomic, cultural
resource and utility engineering considerations.209
Allowing states to generate project impact statements, through the lens of
their role as public trust guardians, would incorporate the American tra-
dition of local land use governance, provide assessment of impacts by those
likely to know them, and allow the federal government to retain control
of the siting and permitting process.210
Because environmental reviews, which in this case would be broad-
ened to project impact reviews, are not records of decision,211 the federal
207 See id. at E-1, E-12 (showing need compared to minor impacts).
208 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 186 n.67 (1997) (noting arguments that the
management of renewable resources often focus on a narrow range of economic values,
excluding information regarding non-commodity values such as protection of biodiversity).
209 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 677.
210 Id. at 671–72.
211 See CAPE WIND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 190, at 1–3.
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government would not be thwarted in attempts to site offshore projects
should they determine the need for those projects. Instead, comprehen-
sive offshore management legislation could include a provision that would
require the lead federal government agency212 to respond to each of the
project impacts and public trust analysis compiled by the state, while leav-
ing the record of decision within the purview of the lead federal agency.
This requisite federal response may be a mere acknowledgment of a proj-
ect impact or outright denial of all or part of the project. The important
aspect of the proposal is having a designated party, in this case the adja-
cent coastal states and their communities, vet the project representing
the interest of the people as public trust guardians.
Additionally, withholding public trust obligations from the federal
government could foster a healthy federalism tension between twin na-
tional policy interests in renewable energy and economic development and
the sometimes competing position of public stewardship of ocean resources
as defined by the public trust.213 This tension may serve to strengthen
awareness of the duty to the public to preserve common ownership of
ocean resources while permitting affected states and their communities
to exercise a stronger voice in a process of exclusive federal prerogative.
CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts Supreme Court missed a prime opportunity to
protect the state’s interest in the public trust with its decision in Alliance.214
Yet, the court did not have the legal means to decide a case to further both
the interests of the public trust in natural resources and national policy in
creating renewable energy.215
212 With most offshore development projects, the lead federal governmental agency would
likely be the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement, which is the federal agency responsible for overseeing the safe and
environmentally responsible development of energy and mineral resources on the Outer
Continental Shelf, or the waters between the state’s territorial seas and the seaward
extent of federal jurisdiction. About BOEMRE, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/aboutBOEMRE/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
213 See Ryan, supra note 155, at 510–11 (noting undefined and overlapping areas of state
and federal authority highlight inherent tensions between problem solving, checks and
balances, localism, and other characteristics of American federalism).
214 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d
787 (Mass. 2010).
215 Id. at 787.
2011] THE SLIPPERY SHELF 221
Although the Cape Wind project was not bound by the Ocean Act
of 2008,216 states contemplating future projects could use this document
as an indication of legislative preference in making decisions about how to
analyze impacts of offshore projects. Furthermore, the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act should be amended to include an independent assessment
by states in their role as public trust defenders to analyze the impacts of an
entire offshore project to their coasts and to the interests of the national
public who would access the commonly owned ocean resources from their
coasts. Once rendered, the analysis could prompt a federal response to the
stated project impacts and state-rendered recommendation on the project’s
impact to public trust interests.217 This would ensure that such interests
have an independent safeguard, established by the federal system, that
would advocate for such interests before a federal government with addi-
tional policy concerns.218 Given the proposals for large-scale investment in
offshore wind energy,219 other states, especially Virginia, New Jersey, and
Maryland, should take preemptive opportunity to enact similar legislation
that specifically protects public trust interests in offshore development
affecting their shores. The U.S. Congress should also amend the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to allow for state-generated assessments of
impact to the public trust resources and require the responsible federal
agency to respond to that assessment.
By doing so, the public can ensure protection of the commonly
owned sea and shore to benefit all citizens, freeing federal agencies to bal-
ance the need for renewable energy against an independent assessment
of detriments to the public’s interest in the utilized resources. Initiative
by the states to register the public trust interests, combined with action by
Congress to allow for adjacent coastal states’ independent assessment of an
entire project located off their coasts, will prevent the public trust doctrine
from escaping notice amidst a hodgepodge of inter-agency administrative
reviews and approvals.
216 See id. at 803–04; Zezima, supra note 130.
217 Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 683.
218 Id.
219 See supra notes 10 & 12 and accompanying text.
